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CASE COMMENT
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.: A Comment on the
Continuing Vitality of Single-Family Zoning Restrictions
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court decided
the scope of an important exemption under the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act (FHAA).2 At issue was a zoning ordinance that banned more
than five unrelated people from living together in a single-family dwelling.
The ordinance was challenged by a group home for recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts; the group argued that by enforcing the regulation the
city had violated the FHAA. The group home contended that the city was
required to make an exception for it because the FHAA requires cities to
make a "reasonable accommodation" in policies and rules for persons with
handicaps. The city's position was that reasonable governmental restric-
tions on the maximum number of occupants of a dwelling are exempted
from the Act's coverage. Thus, the issue for the Court was whether such a
restriction was exempt from the FHAA.
Many believed that a ruling by the Court in City of Edmonds that the
regulation did not fall within the exemption would herald the end of sin-
gle-family zoning.3 In a six to three decision, the Court did indeed rule
that the exemption was not applicable. A careful reading, however, shows
that the decision does not sound the death-knell of single-family zoning.
In fact, the Court's pronouncement is only a limited victory for advocates
of group homes because it only decides a threshold issue. Moreover, the
Court's opinion gives tacit approval of reasonable restrictions on single-
family dwellings.
The Court's ruling does not settle the matter of whether such ordi-
nances actually discriminate against people with handicaps under the
FHAA. That issue was remanded by the Supreme Court to the lower
courts. A recent case from the Eighth Circuit, discussed below, indicates
that ordinances similar to the one at issue in City of Edmonds may be "rea-
sonable" within the meaning of the FHAA.
Part II of this Comment examines the state of the law prior to the
Court's decision. Part III addresses the procedural and background facts
and the majority and dissenting opinions in City of Edmonds. Part IV ana-
lyzes Congress's intent in enacting § 3607 (b) (1), the protected status of the
family, and the difference between an equal right and a preferred right to
housing. Part V considers the state of the law post-City of Edmonds, includ-
1 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 8601-3631 (1994).
3 See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 11, 25, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23) (contending that subject-
ing single-family zoning to FHA scrutiny would "overturn Euclidian zoning" and "destroy the
effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning").
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ing the public reaction to the case and the application of the holding in
subsequent lower court cases. Part VI concludes that while the Court ruled
that zoning restrictions such as those at issue in City of Edmonds are not
exempt from the FHAA, single-family zoning restrictions remain viable.
II. STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO CITY OF E)DMOIDS V. OxFoRD HOUSE,
INC.
A. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
The FHAA was enacted to "extend[ ] the principle of equal housing
opportunity to handicapped persons." 4 The Act amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act, which prohib-
its housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin,
and sex.5 The FHAA was specifically aimed at the "unnecessary exclusion
of [handicapped] persons" as well as "misperceptions, ignorance, and out-
right prejudice." 6 The definitions and concepts of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, which had been the first legislation to protect the handicapped
from discrimination, were incorporated into the FHAA. 7 The FHAA de-
fined handicap,8 with respect to a person as
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does
not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance
as defined in § 802 of Title 21.9
Recovering drug addicts and alcoholics are considered handicapped within
the meaning of the FHAA.10
The FHAA makes it unlawful "[t] o discriminate against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because
of a handicap."'" Discrimination is defined as including "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal oppor-
4 H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2174.
5 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1994).
6 H.R. REP. No. 711, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
7 Id. at 2178.
8 The FHAA's definition of handicap was adopted from section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-794 (1976), which was amended by the Rehabilitation, Comprehen-
sive Services, and Developmental Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (codi-
fied at titles 29, 32, and 42 U.S.C.). The definition of handicap adopted by the FHAA became
effective after 1978.
9 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994).
10 See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that recovering drug addicts are "handicapped" under 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.201 (a) (2) (1994) (interpreting "[p]hysical or mental impairment" in § 3602(h) (1)-(3) of
the FHAA to include "drug addiction (other than addiction caused by current, illegal use of a
controlled substance) and alcoholism").
11 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2) (1994).
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tunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."' 2 A failure to do so constitutes discrim-
ination. Although the FHAA does not mention the Act's applicability to
zoning, the legislative history of the FHAA specifically mentions zoning.' 3
B. Section 3607(b)(1)
Despite its broad scope, the FHAA exempts certain housing restric-
tions. 14 Section 3607(b) (1) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter limits
the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions re-
garding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing."' 5 This seemingly straightforward language gave rise to two competing
interpretations, discussed more completely below.
The legislative history of § 3607(b) (1) is somewhat ambiguous in that
it fails to specify whether the exemption applies only to maximum occu-
pancy restrictions that are based on numerical formulas such as square
footage or number of bedrooms or whether it extends to any reasonable
limitation on the number of occupants. As a result, both interpretations
have found support from it. According to the House Judiciary Committee
Report,
[t]hese provisions are not intended to limit the applicability of any rea-
sonable local, State, or Federal restrictions on the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling unit. A number ofjurisdictions
limit the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of
square feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of the unit. Reasonable limi-
tations by governments would be allowed to continue, as long as they
were applied to all occupants, and did not operate to discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap or familial
status. 16
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Maximum Occupancy Exemption: The
Restrictive View
Prior to the Court's decision in City of Edmonds, the majority of courts
held that the exemption applies only to building and occupancy codes
designed to prevent overcrowding.' 7 According to these decisions, a zon-
12 Id.
13 "The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination against those with
handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the applica-
tion of special requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional
or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the
residence of their choice in the community." H.. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN. 2173, 2185. Of course, given the Court's holding in City of
Edmonds, the FHAA now unquestionably applies to zoning.
14 Besides the exemption for maximum occupancy restrictions, the FHAA exempts regula-
tions pertaining to religious organizations and private clubs, housing for older persons, and regu-
lations aimed at persons convicted of the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances.
42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1994).
15 Id. at §3607(b)(1).
16 H.R. REP. No. 711, at 31, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.N. at 2192.
17 See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994);
Oxford House v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Oxford House v. City of
Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993).
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ing ordinance that only applies to unrelated persons is not exempted. This
position relies upon the inclusion in the House Judiciary Committee's Re-
port of the finding that a number ofjurisdictions limit the number of occu-
pants by mathematical formula, without regard to status of occupants.18
These courts interpreted the report to indicate that Congress intended this
to be the only permissible restriction.' 9 Accordingly, because the five-per-
son limitation in City of Edmonds only applied to unrelated occupants, the
ordinance would not be exempted under the restrictive view.
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Maximum Occupancy Exemption: The
Nonrestrictive View
The nonrestrictive view, followed in the Eleventh Circuit,20 concludes
that any reasonable limitation on the number of people that can occupy a
dwelling is exempt. This analysis assumes that Congress was aware ofjudi-
cial precedent concerning restrictions on maximum occupancy and en-
acted § 3607(b) (1) and that the House Judiciary Committee Report was
written with that precedent in mind.2' Since the Supreme Court had up-
held a maximum occupancy restriction that only applied to unrelated per-
sons in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,22 Congress knew that the Supreme
Court approved of zoning restrictions that apply only to unrelated persons.
Additionally, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,23 the Court had declared
unconstitutional an ordinance that made it illegal for a woman to live with
her grandson under a narrow construction of the definition of "family." A
synthesis of the two cases produces a rule that permits restrictions on maxi-
mum occupancy that apply only to unrelated persons, but forbids restric-
tions on maximum occupancy that apply to families.24 In this context,
§ 3607(b) (1) is interpreted as exempting ordinances that limit maximum
occupancy, ordinances which are in themselves limited to regulating unre-
lated persons.25 With respect to the House Judiciary Committee Report,
the Eleventh Circuit believed that the discussion of the square-footage
method of regulating occupancy was merely illustrative of one reasonable
means of regulation and not meant to exclude other potentially reasonable
regulations. 26 Additionally, the word "reasonable" in the Act is empha-
sized.27 The Act prohibits unreasonable restrictions having a disparate im-
pact upon people with handicaps; it does not prohibit maximum
occupancy restrictions that apply only to unrelated persons.28
18 H.R. REP. No. 711, at 31, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2192.
19 Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 805.
20 Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 940 (1992).
21 Id. at 980.
22 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
23 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
24 Elliot4 960 F.2d at 980.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 981.
28 Id. at 981-84.
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III. Gnro F F DMONDS V. OxMORO HOUSE, INC.
A. Background and Procedural History
In 1990, Oxford House, Inc.2 9 leased a residence in Edmonds, Wash-
ington in order to establish a group home for ten to twelve recovering
alcoholics and drug addicts in a single-family residential zone.30 Because of
the large number of occupants, the group home was in violation of the
city's zoning ordinance.3' Although the city's zoning ordinance permitted
group homes within single-family residential zones, it limited the number
of unrelated occupants who could occupy a single-family dwelling to five.3 2
Once the city became aware of the presence of the group home, it issued
criminal citations for violation of the zoning code.33
Oxford House responded by asking Edmonds to make an exception,
allowing it to continue to operate the home.m The city refused the re-
quest, but it did pass an ordinance listing group homes as permitted uses in
multi-family and general commercial zones.35 Edmonds brought a declara-
tory judgment action in a federal district court seeking a ruling that its
zoning ordinance was consistent with the FHAA.36 Oxford House brought
a counterclaim maintaining that the city had violated the FHAA by not
making a "reasonable accommodation."37 The United States filed a similar
action and the two cases were consolidated.3 8
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Edmonds.
The court held that the zoning ordinance was exempted from the FHAA
because it was a "reasonable restriction[ ] regarding the maximum number
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling"3 9 and therefore did not vio-
late the FHAA.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.4° The court concluded that
Edmonds' zoning ordinance was not exempted by § 3607(b) (1) because it
29 Oxford House, Inc. is a non-profit corporation that has chartered over 375 individual
group homes for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics. Joint Appendix at 116-19, City of Ed-
monds (No. 94-23).
30 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779.
31 Id.
[T]he Oxford House has adopted a rather high-handed policy: "As a matter of practice,
Oxford House, Inc. does not seek prior approval of zoning regulations before moving
into a residential neighborhood." Apparently, the Oxford House believes that if mem-
bers of the group move in quietly without notice it will be harder to evict them. This
strategy is evident throughout this appeal. United States of America v. Palatine, 37 F.3d
1230, 1234-35 (1994) (Manion, J., concurring).
32 Edmonds Community Development Code § 21.30.010 (1990) (limiting occupancy in sin-
gle-family dwelling units to "families," which are defined under the city's code as "an individual or
two or more person related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer per-
sons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage").
33 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. The city, however, agreed to suspend enforcement of
the zoning ordinance pending outcome of the litigation. City of Edmonds v. Washington State
Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 803 (1994).
34 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 42 U.S.C. §3607(b) (1) (1994).
40 City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994).
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only applied to unrelated people.41 The court construed the legislative his-
tory as limiting the § 3607(b) (1) exemption to maximum occupancy re-
strictions that apply to both related and unrelated occupants. 42 Edmonds
appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve the
split between the circuits.
B. The Majority
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. She was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Souter, O'Connor, and Breyer. As a pre-
liminary matter, the Court declined an opportunity to dismiss the case as
moot because of a recent Washington law.43
The Court emphasized that the only issue before it was whether Ed-
monds' ordinance qualified for the § 3607(b) (1) exemption. 44 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not decide whether the ordinance in question
constituted discrimination under the FHAA.45
The focus of the Court's analysis was whether a restriction on the
number of unrelated individuals that could occupy a dwelling constituted a
"reasonable ... restriction[ ] regarding the maximum number of occu-
pants permitted to occupy a dwelling."4 6 There are, concluded the Court,
two kinds of restrictions that place limits on the number of people that may
occupy a dwelling: municipal land use restrictions and maximum occu-
pancy restrictions. The Court explained the difference:
Land use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused by the "pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard." In particular, reserving land for single-
family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods securing
"zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." To limit land
use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term "fam-
ily"; thus family composition rules are an essential component of single-
family residential use restrictions. Maximum occupancy restrictions, in
contradistinction, cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in
relation to available floor space or the number and type of rooms. These
restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling
units. Their purpose is to protect health and safety by preventing dwell-
ing overcrowding.47
41 Id. at 807.
42 Id. at 805.
43 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 n.3. Washington's law provided:
[n]o city may enact or maintain an ordinance, development regulation, zoning regula-
tion or official control, policy, or administrative practice which treats a residential struc-
ture differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family or other
unrelated individuals. As used in this section, 'handicaps' are as defined in the federal
fair housing amendments act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. § 3602). WASH. REv. CODE § 35.63.220
(1994).
44 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780.
45 Id. at n.4.
46 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1) (1994).
47 City of Edmonds, 115 S.Ct. at 1781 (citations omitted).
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The Court found support for its distinction in an earlier case, Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,48 and in the legislative history of the FHAA.49 Having
made the distinction between land use restrictions and maximum occu-
pancy restrictions, the Court concluded that only the latter are within the
exemption.5 0
Under the Court's analysis, Edmonds' ordinance easily fell into the
nonexempt category. Edmonds argued that the ordinance was a maximum
occupancy restriction because it capped at five the number of unrelated
people that could occupy a single-family dwelling. The majority rejected
the argument that the ordinance was not a maximum occupancy statute
because it did not answer the question "What is the maximum number of
[related and unrelated] occupants permitted to occupy a house?"51
According to the Court, Edmonds' contention that "subjecting single-
family zoning to FHA scrutiny will 'overturn Euclidian zoning' and 'destroy
the effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning'" was misplaced be-
cause it "both ignores the limited scope of the issue before us and exagger-
ates the force of the FHA's antidiscrimination provisions. "52 Here, the
Court underscores that its holding is limited to whether Edmonds' ordi-
nance is exempt under § 3607(b) (1) and that the FHA's antidiscrimination
provisions are limited to unreasonable restrictions. Thus, the Court delib-
erately leaves the door open for reasonable single-family zoning restric-
tions. By limiting the scope of its decision and emphasizing the
reasonableness standard, the Court denied group home advocates a deci-
sive victory.
C. The Dissent
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. Justice Thomas's basic argument was that the majority's opinion
failed to "give effect to the plain language of the statute."53 According to
the dissent, Edmonds' ordinance was a "reasonable . . .restriction[ I re-
garding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing" because it set a limit on the number of unrelated persons that could
occupy a dwelling in a single-family neighborhood. In the dissent's view,
the ordinance did not have to set an equivalent limit on the number of
related occupants because the statute did not specify that only restrictions
applying to both related and unrelated people qualified for the exemp-
tion.5 4 "[Section] 3607(b) (1) does not set forth a narrow exemption only
for 'absolute' or 'unqualified' restrictions regarding the maximum number
of occupants. Instead it sweeps broadly to exempt any restrictions regard-
ing such maximum number."55
48 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
49 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50 City of Edmonds, 115 S.Ct. at 1782.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1783.
53 Id. at 1783 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
54 Id. at 1784 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
55 Id. (emphasis added).
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The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the ordi-
nance failed because it did not specify the absolute number of persons per-
mitted to occupy a house.56 On the contrary, the ordinance "establish [ed]
a specific number-five-as the maximum number of unrelated persons
permitted to occupy a dwelling in the single-family neighborhoods of Ed-
monds, Washington." 57 "In other words, petitioner's zoning code estab-
lishes for certain dwellings 'a five-occupant limit, [with] an exception for
[traditional] families."'58
Again, referring to the language of the statute, the dissent pointed out
that § 3607(b) (1) exempts "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restric-
tions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling."59 The ordinance falls within the exemption because it is a re-
striction on maximum occupancy, albeit limited to unrelated people. The
exemption does not require that both unrelated and related occupants be
affected. "It is difficult to imagine what broader terms Congress could have
used to signify the categories or kinds of relevant governmental restrictions
that are exempt from the FHA."60
Justice Thomas gave two examples to illustrate that the Edmonds ordi-
nance is a maximum occupancy restriction: First, if a real estate agent who
had just been assigned to the city of Edmonds were to ask whether the city
had any restrictions on the maximum number of occupants permitted to
occupy a building, the answer would have to be yes; "the maximum
number of unrelated persons permitted to occupy a dwelling in a single-
family neighborhood is five."6' The second example involves the Auto-
bahn in the Federal Republic of Germany. Assume that the German gov-
ernment imposed no restrictions on the speed of 'cars' driving on the
Autobahn, but limited the speed at which 'trucks' could travel. If someone
were to ask whether there were any restrictions on the maximum speed of
motor vehicles on the Autobahn, the answer would be yes, that there is a
maximum restriction on the speed at which trucks can drive on the
Autobahn.62
The majority, according to Justice Thomas, misinterpreted the exemp-
tion: The majority's mistake is that it asks "What is the maximum number
of occupants permitted to occupy a house?" 63 The majority believes that
for an ordinance to satisfy the exemption it must impose a limit on the
absolute maximum number of occupants. When the majority submits the
Edmonds ordinance to this higher standard, it fails. In contrast, the dis-
senters state that the statute only requires the ordinance to impose a re-
striction "regarding" the maximum number of occupants. "Surely, a
restriction can 'regar[d] '-or 'concern,' 'relate to,' or 'bear on'-the max-
56 Id. at 1782.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1784 (quoting from the Tr. of Oral Arg. 46) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
60 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. (quoting from Id. at 1782).
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imum number of occupants without establishing an absolute maximum
number in all cases."64
The dissent also criticizes the majority's example of a "prototypical
maximum occupancy restriction."65 The housing ordinance that would sat-
isfy the requirements of § 3607(b) (1), according to the majority's point of
view, "caps the number of occupants a dwelling may house, based on floor
area."66 This ordinance, explains Justice Thomas, does not satisfy the ma-
jority's test of "What is the absolute maximum number of occupants that
are permitted to occupy a house?" 67 The ordinance cannot answer the ma-
jority's question because the answer depends upon the floor area of a
house. A large house could accommodate more people than a smaller
one. Thus, "the answer to the majority's question is the same with respect
to both § 503 (b) and ECDC § 21.30.010: 'it depends.' With respect to the
former, it depends on the size of the house's bedrooms; with respect to the
latter, it depends on whether the house's occupants are related."68
Furthermore, the dissent objects to the majority's "interpretive prem-
ise," which "regard[s] this case as an instance in which an exception to 'a
general statement of policy' is sensibly read 'narrowly in order to preserve
the primary operation of the [policy].' 69 The disagreement is on two
grounds: First, the "policy" of the FHA does notjustify an atypical interpre-
tive premise because all statutes have a "policy."70 Second, the majority's
interpretive premise encroaches on Congressional power.
Nor could the reason be that a narrow reading of s[ection] 3607(b) (1) is
necessary to preserve the primary operation of the FHA's stated policy "to
provide .. . for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C.
s[ection] 3601. Congress, the body responsible for deciding how specifi-
cally to achieve the objective of fair housing, obviously believed that sec-
tion 3607 (b) (1)'s exemption for "any . . . restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" is con-
sistent with the FHA's general statement of policy. We do Congress no
service-indeed, we negate the "primary operation" of s[ection]
3607(b) (1)-by giving that congressional enactment an artificially nar-
row reading.7 1
Additionally, Supreme Court precedent requires that "Congress
should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the
historic powers of the States."7 2 Accordingly, since zoning is an area of
regulation that has traditionally been left to state and local governments,
64 Id.
65 Id. at n.2 (quoting from Id. at 1782).
66 Id. at 1782.
67 Id. at 1784 n.2. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (citations omitted).
69 Id. at 1780 (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989)).
70 Id. at 1785 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1786 (Thomas,J, dissenting) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)
(citations omitted)).
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the dissent states "even if it might be sensible in other contexts to construe
exemptions narrowly, that principle has no application in this case."73
The dissent also criticizes the majority's conclusion that "maximum
occupancy restrictions" was a phrase in use prior to the enactment of the
FHAA. It rejects the majority's distinction between maximum occupancy
restrictions and municipal land use restrictions or "family composition"
rules.7 4 Claiming that the majority's categorization of "maximum occu-
pancy restrictions" was "simply invented," the dissent argues that the statute
does not make the same distinction that the majority does.75 Moreover,
since no state or judicial opinion used the term prior to 1992, it is unlikely
that Congress "enacted section 3607 (b) (1) against the backdrop of an evi-
dent distinction between municipal land use restrictions and maximum oc-
cupancy restrictions."76
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Congress Never Contemplated This Issue
Prior to passage of the FHAA, the legality of restrictions on the maxi-
mum number of unrelated persons who could occupy a house within a
single-family residential zone had been upheld by the Supreme Court in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.77 That such restrictions were permitted prior
to passage of the FHAA does not itself provide much of an argument for
their continuing legality. But given the prevalence of such restrictions, and
the impact that outlawing them would have upon ordinances in thousands
of cities, it seems likely that if Congress had truly intended to forbid restric-
tions such as those upheld in Belle Terre, the language of the Act and the
House Judiciary Committee Report would have been less equivocal. In
other words, because there is no discussion of the effect of the FHAA upon
a very common type of zoning restriction, it stands to reason that no effect
was intended.
The type of discrimination sought to be prevented by the FHAA was
discrimination against persons based solely upon the existence of a handi-
cap. Congress was concerned about the type of discrimination that arose
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.78 In City of Cleburne, the Court
ruled that a zoning ordinance requiring special use permits for group
homes for the mentally retarded but not for other group homes violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court concluded that the reason permits
were required for the group home was because of the "irrational fears of
the property owners." 79
It was noted in the House Judiciary Committee Report that,
73 Id. at 1786.
74 Id. at 1786-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 1787 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1787 (quoting from 1780) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
78 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
79 Id. at 432.
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[wihile state and local governments have authority to protect safety and
health, and to regulate use of land, that authority has sometimes been
used to restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps to live in commu-
nities. This has been accomplished by such means as the enact-
ment.., of... land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements
among non-related persons with disabilities. Since these requirements
are not imposed on families and groups of similar size of other unrelated
people, these requirements have the effect of discriminating against per-
sons with disabilities.8 0
This passage of the Report included a footnote to the Cleburne case indicat-
ing that legislative intent was focused on eradicating the kind of discrimina-
tion forbidden in that case three years earlier. That Congress intended to
codify the Cleburne decision is also shown by the concern, in the text above,
that requirements were imposed upon persons with handicaps and not on
similarly situated individuals. Furthermore, the only kind of discrimination
mentioned in the House Judiciary Committee Report was the type of dis-
crimination addressed in the Cleburne case.
Congress intended to prevent disparate treatment of persons with
handicaps; e.g., situations where families or groups of unrelated persons
could live in a certain zone, but individuals with handicaps could not be-
cause of restrictions based on stereotypes and ignorance.
The foregoing scenario is different from the one presented in City of
Edmonds. The Edmonds ordinance did not discriminate between persons
with or without handicaps, but between related and unrelated persons. As
long as group homes complied with the occupancy limitations applied to
all other unrelated individuals living in shared housing,. they were allowed
to operate within the single-family residential. Maximum occupancy re-
strictions, such as Edmonds', do not single out the handicapped for dis-
criminatory treatment. They apply to all unrelated individuals, without
regard to handicap, race, sex, or religion.
B. Protected Status of the Family
Despite the Court's disparagement of the Edmonds ordinance as a
"family values preserver,"8 ' the Court has previously recognized the role of
zoning to protect family values.
Beginning with the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,8 2
the Supreme Court has upheld the exclusion of uses inappropriate to resi-
dential districts by way of zoning. The Supreme Court established the pro-
tected status of the family in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.8 3 In Belle Terre,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that limited
the occupancy of single-family dwellings to traditional families or to groups
80 H.1. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1988), reprfinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 2173,
2185.
81 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783.
82 272 U.S. 265 (1926).
83 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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of two or less unrelated individuals.8 4 According to the Court, the police
power extended beyond the mere prevention of nuisances.
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles re-
stricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people.85
The family's status was reaffirmed two years later in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.86 In Moore, an East Cleveland housing ordinance restricted occu-
pancy of single-family dwellings to certain categories of related individuals
such that a grandmother who lived with her son and two grandsons was
found to be in violation of the ordinance. Belle Terre's expansion of the
police power did not control here, explained the Court, because of the
"overriding factor" that the ordinance in Belle Terre only affected unrelated
individuals.87 "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural."88 Thus, in Moore, the Court concluded that the extended, as
well as nuclear, family was entitled to constitutional protection. 89 These
decisions establish ample precedent for the protection of families through
zoning.
C. Equal Access to Housing Does Not Mean a Preferred Right to Housing
The FHAA guarantees the handicapped the right to equal housing op-
portunity, not a right to preferred housing opportunities.90 At the same
time, however, the rights of the handicapped must be balanced with those
of the rest of the community. Group homes have the same effect on neigh-
borhoods that any house with a large number of unrelated adults would:
more cars, more noise, and more people.91 The Supreme Court has held
84 Id. at 7.
85 Id. at 9.
86 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
87 Id. at 498.
88 Id. at 503-04.
89 "Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of
the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition." Id. at 504-05.
90 The FHAA guarantees the handicapped an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwell-
ing." 42 U.S.CA.A § 3604(f) (3) (B) (1994). Courts disagree whether the FHAA guarantees the
right to live in a specific dwelling. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 911 F. Supp. 918,
945 (D.Md.1996) ("The Act does not require that people with disabilities be given preferential
access to housing, unless that access is necessary to accommodate their special needs."). Contra
Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("s[ection]
3604 (f) (3) (B) dictates that a handicapped individual must be allowed to enjoy a particular dwell-
ing, not just some dwelling somewhere in the town.").
91 "These institutional uses are not only inconsistent with the single-housekeeping-unit con-
cept but include many more people than would normally inhabit a single-family dwelling." Moore,
431 U.S. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that zoning restrictions which further family values by restricting cars, hous-
ing density, and population density are "legitimate guidelines."92
Reasonable restrictions, such as those at issue in City of Edmonds, do
not prohibit persons with handicaps from living in single-family residential
zones. Persons with handicaps may live as of right in group homes which
adhere to zoning regulations or with relatives or by themselves. Rather,
persons with handicaps are only restricted if they choose to live in a group
home with more than the permissible number of occupants. This restric-
tion, however, does not single out people with handicaps; it applies to all
unrelated persons. The restriction, then, is not discriminatory and does
not come within the scope of the FHAA. Treating individuals with handi-
caps in a non-paternalistic manner also helps to dispel the myth that they
are inferior.93
V. PosT-Cn-' OF EDMONDS
A. Public Reaction to City of Edmonds
The media reaction to the City of Edmonds decision was interesting be-
cause the perception of the scope of the decision was far from uniform. A
common misconception was that the City of Edmonds court had invalidated
the city's ordinance. According to the Los Angeles Times, the Court "gave
the law a liberal interpretation so as to invalidate local ordinances that bar
five or more unrelated persons from living together in a neighborhood of
single-family homes."9 4 The editorial from another newspaper criticized
the Court's ruling that "local governments may not use zoning restrictions
to bar group homes for alcoholics and drug addicts from neighborhoods of
single-family homes."95 The San Francisco Chronicle reported that cities were
now forbidden from setting occupancy limits unless the limits applied to
both unrelated and related people.96 Similarly, one editorial proclaimed
that the City of Edmonds decision said that "the Fair Housing Act exempts
group homes for the disabled from local zoning codes that limit the
number of occupants in single-family homes."97 It is remarkable that the
City of Edmonds decision would be so consistently misinterpreted, especially
in light of the Court's explicit statement of the limited nature of its
holding.
92 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
93 "[A] genuinely evenhanded, non-paternalistic policy towards people with disabilities rec-
ognizes that 'individuals with disabilities are entitled to the cultural opportunities, surroundings,
experiences, risks, and associations enjoyed by people without disabilities.'" Bryant Woods Inn,
Inc. v. Howard County, 911 F. Supp. 918, 945 (D. Md. 1996) (citations omitted).
94 David G. Savage, Court Says Cities Can't Bar Homes for Ex-Addicts, Los ANGELES T rsEs, May
16, 1995, at Al.
95 Court Rejects Notion of Family, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 19, 1995, at A14.
96 Linda Greenhouse, Group Homes For Disabled Win Protection/Supreme Court limits the use of
zoning laws, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., May 16, 1995, at Al.
97 Group Homes Win Big in Court, S.A-rrLE POSr-INTELIIGENCER, May 21, 1995, at E2.
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B. The Application of City of Edmonds in Subsequent Cases
The sweep of City of Edmonds has proved to be much narrower than
group home advocates had predicted. Instead of wiping out single-family
zoning, City of Edmonds has merely added ajudicial gloss to the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation."
The most recent case to apply the holding of City of Edmonds to similar
facts is Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis.98 This case is significant, if for no
other reason, because it dispels the apparent belief of group home advo-
cates that any restriction on group homes was per se unreasonable under
the FHAA. In City of St. Louis, the city's zoning code included group homes
of eight or fewer unrelated handicapped individuals within the definition
of single-family dwelling.99 Oxford House established a group home in a
single-family residential area with more than eight occupants. Once the
city realized the violation, it cited the group home. Oxford House refused
to apply for a variance from the eight-person limitation and sued the city
alleging that the city had violated the Fair Housing Act.'00 The district
court ruled that the city had violated the Fair Housing Act by enforcing its
zoning code against Oxford House. 1° 1 The court also enjoined the city
from enforcing its zoning code against the group homes. 10 2
The Eight Circuit, however, reversed the district court, finding that
the city had not "unlawfully discriminated against, failed to accommodate,
[or] interfered with the housing rights of the handicapped men."103 Even
though the court acknowledged City of Edmonds, it held that the ordinance
did not violate the FHAA. The court noted that the ordinance actually
favored handicapped people because it allowed group homes to have up to
eight residents, while otherwise permitting only three unrelated people to
live together in a single-family zone. 10 4
The financial viability argument, which Oxford House and other
group home advocates have consistently relied upon as a basis for the al-
leged unreasonableness of restrictions on group homes, 10 5 did not per-
suade the court. Accordingly, the court rejected the district court's finding
that the city's zoning ordinances discriminated against the group home
because an eight-person limit would destroy the financial viability of many
Oxford Houses. 0 6 "Even if the eight-person rule causes some financial
hardship for Oxford House, however, the rule does not violate the Fair
98 Nos. 94-1600, 94-3073, 1996 WL 75685 (8th Cir. Feb. 23, 1996).
99 ST. Louis, Mo., REV. CODE tit. 26, § 26.20.020(a)(1) (1994).
100 Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
101 Id. at 1584.
102 Id.
103 City of St. Louis, 1996 WL 75685, at *2.
104 City of St. Louis, 1996 WL 775685, at *2 (citing ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE tit. 26,
§ 26.20.020(a) (1) (1994)).
105 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1779 (U.S. 1995) ("Group home
users, Oxford urged, need 8 to 12 residents to be financially.., viable."); Elliott v. City of Athens,
960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The only evidence of disparate impact was ... the testimony that
a group home for recovering alcoholics... could not be economically feasible with fewer than 12
residents.").
106 Id.
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Housing Act if the City had a rational basis for enacting the rule." 107 Thus,
the court concludes that the negative financial impact of an ordinance on a
group home does not necessarily make that ordinance unreasonable. This
reaffirms that the Fair Housing Act only requires a city to make reasonable
accommodations in its zoning code when necessary to give handicapped
people an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 08
The city was justified in its zoning restriction, opined the court, be-
cause "[c]ities have a legitimate interest in decreasing congestion, traffic,
and noise in residential areas, and ordinances restricting the number of
unrelated people who may occupy a single-family residence are reasonably
related to these legitimate goals." 109 Furthermore, explained the court,
"[t]he city does not need to assert a specific reason for choosing eight as
the cut-off point, rather than ten or twelve.""10
The court also expressed its disapproval with Oxford House's tactic of
using the federal courts as a first step instead of trying to work with the
local zoning board by applying for a variance. "Congress did not intend
the federal courts to act as zoning boards by deciding fact-intensive accom-
modation issues in the first instance.""' The court insisted that Oxford
House could not claim that St. Louis had failed to make a reasonable ac-
commodation when the group home had failed to apply for a variance.
"Their refusal is fatal to their reasonable accommodation claim.""12
The Eighth Circuit's decision in City of St. Louis indicates that single-
family zoning is far from dead. Cities can make reasonable regulations that
preserve the character of single-family residential areas, while still accom-
modating group homes.
Although cities still risk litigation if they try to enforce restrictions such
as those in City of Edmonds, the holding in City of St. Louis gives group
homes and cities some post-City of Edmonds guidance. First, unless a group
home applies for a variance, a city will not likely be deemed to have failed
to make a "reasonable accommodation." Group homes should not use the
courts as first-resort zoning boards. Second, group homes cannot rely on a
financial viability argument. The mere fact that a larger number of occu-
pants in a group home would increase revenue will not suffice for a show-
ing of unreasonableness." 3 Finally, cities can argue the Eighth Circuit's
holding in City of St. Louis, along with similar holdings,"14 to justify reason-
107 Id. (citing Farnilystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991)).
108 42 U.S.CA § 3604(f) (3) (B) (1994).
109 City of St. Louis, 1996 WL 75685, at *2 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9
(1974)). Oxford House states that the average length of stay for a resident is about thirteen
months. Brief for Respondents Oxford House, Inc. at 6, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23).
110 City of St. Louis, 1996 WL 75685, at *2.
111 Id. at *3 (citing Oxford House v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D. Va.
1993)).
112 Id.
113 On the other hand, if the permitted number of occupants was so low as to be unable to
sustain any group home, even one operated by a non-profit organization, that would seem to
indicate that the ordinance was unreasonable.
114 See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 911 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
that a refusal to permit a group home to increase its number of residents from eight to fifteen is
not a failure to make a reasonable accommodation).
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able restrictions designed to maintain the integrity and character of single-
family neighborhoods.
VI. CONCLUSION
City of Edmonds, despite its potential for becoming an important deci-
sion, ultimately decided a narrow legal issue. The ordinance at issue in the
case was not invalidated, the Court held only that it was not exempt from
the Act's coverage. The Court remanded the issue of whether the ordi-
nance discriminated against the handicapped to the lower court. After City
of Edmonds, cities are still free to establish and regulate single-family neigh-
borhoods; the only difference is that now cities with restrictions like those
at issue in Edmonds may not claim the protection of § 3607(b) (1).
Perhaps the most significant dimension of the City of Edmonds Court's
decision is its weak support for the FHAA. From the majority's narrow tex-
tual reading of the statute, it appears that in order to garner a majority
Justice Ginsburg had to chart a narrow course between the Scylla of civil
rights, on one hand, and the Charybdis of family values, on the other. By
failing to champion either civil rights, as the Court did in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,1 5 or family values, as it did in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas"6 and East Cleveland v. Moore,117 the Court ultimately disap-
pointed both sides.
Stephen C. Hall
115 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that requiring a special use permit for a group home for the
retarded, while not requiring a similar permit for similar uses, violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
116 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a maximum occupancy restriction in a single family zone
that only applied to unrelated people).
117 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a narrow definition of "family" that did not permit a
grandmother to live with her grandson violated Due Process).
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